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BANKS AND BANKING-BANK MAY FINANCE THE INVOLUNTARY TAKE-
OVER OF ONE OF ITS BORROWERS AND MAY, IN MAKING ITS LOAN
DECISION, RELY ON CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THE
TAKEOVER TARGET.
Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp. (1979)
Defendant Chemical Bank (Chemical), having made a substantial loan to
plaintiff Washington Steel Corporation (Washington Steel),1 and having
served as a registrar of Washington Steel's common stock, 2 became privy to
confidential information concerning the corporation's financial affairs. 3 This
information included a study projecting Washington Steel's growth and earn-
ings potential through 1982, as well as periodic financial statements.
4
In January, 1979, Talley Industries, Inc. (Talley),5 which had long been
a borrower from Chemical, 6 sought financial backing from Chemical for a
proposed acquisition of Washington Steel through a cash tender offer. 7 A
bank officer responsible for the Washington Steel account attended an in-
trabank meeting at which the propriety of financing Talley's acquisition of
Washington Steel was discussed. 8 His participation in the discussion was
limited to statements that Chemical had a loan relationship with Washington
Steel and that Washington Steel's response to the takeover proposal could
not be predicted. 9
Unwilling to acquiesce in the proposed takeover, 10 Washington Steel
sought to enjoin the tender offer, 11 alleging 1) that Talley had made in-
1. Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d 594, 596 (3d Cir. 1979). On January 15,
1974, Washington had entered into a loan agreement with Morgan Guaranty Trust Company,
Pittsburgh National Bank, and Chemical, in which the three banks together agreed to provide
the plaintiff with financing of up to $10,000,000. Id. Chemical had agreed to make loans to a
maximum of $2,250,000. Id.
2. Id. Chemical's duty as registrar for Washington Steel was to prevent the issuance of
shares in excess of the number authorized by Washington Steel's charter. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Talley is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Delaware. Washington
Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 465 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (W.D. Pa.), rev'd, 602 F.2d 594 (3d Cir.
1979). TW Corporation is a wholly owned subsidiary of Talley formed for the purpose of carry-
ing out the Washington Steel takeover. Brief for Defendant Chemical Bank at 6, Washington
Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1979).
6. 602 F.2d at 596.
7. Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 465 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (W.D. Pa.), revd, 602
F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1979). For a discussion of the tender offer method of corporate acquisition,
see notes 20-23 and accompanying text infro.
8. 602 F.2d at 596.
9. Id. at 603.
10. Washington Steel's management rejected both of Talley's offers to acquire Washington
Steel common stock, characterizing the proposals as "inadequate and not in the best interest of
the company and its shareholders." Wall St. J., Jan. 31, 1979, at 28, col. 1. After its offers were
rejected, Talley announced that it would circumvent Washington Steel management by appeal-
ing directly to the stockholders through a cash tender offer. Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1979, at 12,
col. 2. For a discussion of the tender offer mechanism, see notes 20-23 and accompanying text
infra.
11. 602 F.2d at 597.
(981)
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adequate disclosures and had engaged in deceptive practices, l2 and 2) that
Chemical had breached the fiduciary duty owed to Washington Steel
through its misuse of confidential information. 13  The district court ruled
that Chemical had violated a fiduciary duty to its loan customer, Washington
Steel, by participating in the takeover loan 14 and restrained Chemical's
financing of the takeover attempt. 1 5  The court refused, however, to enjoin
the tender offer itself.16 Talley withdrew its tender offer while appeal was
pending, 17 thus making it unnecessary to seek to overturn the injunction
12. 465 F. Supp. at 1101. Washington Steel alleged that Talley had violated §§ 14(d) and
14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)-(e) (1976), because its offering
statement did not "adequately inform or disclose particular information to the shareholders of
Washington Steel as is required by law." 465 F. Supp. 1101.
13. 465 F. Supp. at 1101. Washington Steel also contended that a broker-dealer partnership
had "misappropriated confidential and proprietary information." Id. at 1102.
14. Id. at 1105. The district court opinion was written by Judge Simmons. Id. at 1101. The
district court found that Chemical Bank was the "agent" of Washington Steel and owed a
"fiduciary obligation to advance the best interests and welfare of the Plaintiff Washington Steel."
Id. at 1104. The court condemned Chemical's "egregious and unethical" participation in the
takeover loan and failure to disclose the "fact that it was operating in an adverse agency rela-
tionship and a dual agency relationship with an adverse party." Id. at 1105.
While not discussed in the District Court or Court of Appeals opinions, Chemical argued
before the District Court that it had established an effective "Chinese Wall" which prevented
the officer in charge of the Talley account from obtaining information from the officer responsi-
ble for the Washington Steel account. See Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1979, at 4, col. 2. Chemical
admitted, however, that two officers responsible for the Washington Steel account had attended
a five-minute meeting with the bank vice-president responsible for corporate loans during which
the Talley loan was authorized. Id., col. 4. During oral argument, the district court observed
that this meeting was tantamount to sharing information and negated the bank's "Chinese Wall"
defense. Id. Moreover, apparently doubting the officer's testimony, the trial judge expressed
disbelief that the decision to make a multimillion dollar loan could be made in five minutes. Id.
For the Third Circuit's contrary interpretation of the purpose of the meeting, see notes 49-55
and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the operation of a "Chinese Wall," see notes
40-42 and accompanying text infra.
15. 465 F. Supp. at 1105-06. In compliance with rule 65(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the district court had conditioned the issuance of the preliminary injunction on
Washington Steel's posting of a $2,000,000 bond. 602 F.2d at 598. The bond is a security set at
the trial judge's discretion representing an estimate of the anticipated losses which will be
suffered by the party enjoined in the case of wrongful issuance. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
The fundamental policy consideration underlying the requirement that a plaintiff seeking a
preliminary injunction post a bond is the
belief that a defendant deserves protection against a court order granted without the full
deliberation a trial offers. That protection consists of a promise that the defendant will be
reimbursed for losses suffered if it turns out that the order issued was erroneous in the
sense that it would not have been issued if there had been the opportunity for full delib-
eration.
American Bible Soc'y v. Blount, 446 F.2d 588, 595 n. 12 (3d Cir. 1971), citing Note, Interlocu-
tory Injunctions and the Injunction Bond, 73 HARv. L. REV. 333, 336, 340 (1959).
16. 465 F. Supp. at 1106. Although expressly granting preliminary injunctive relief for the
bank's breach of fiduciary duty, the district court denied injunctive relief for Talley's alleged
inadequate disclosures and deceptive practices surrounding the tender offer. See id. at 1105-06.
Judge Simmons specifically stated that Talley would not be precluded from proceeding with its
tender offer if it obtained alternate financing. Id. However, some financial analysts suggested
that Talley was so deeply in debt that it would be unable to find another bank willing to take
the lead in a similar financing agreement. Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1979, at 4, col. 2.
17. 602 F.2d at 598. On March 9, 1979, after the district court had enjoined Chemical's
participation in the Talley loan, Washington Steel's management endorsed a $40 per common
[VOL. 25: p. 981
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against Chemical's loan participation. Nevertheless, both Chemical and Tal-
ley appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
asserting claims for damages resulting from the injunction against Chemical's
participation in the tender offer. 18 The Third Circuit' 9 reversed and re-
manded, holding that the injunction had been wrongfully issued since a bank
may finance the involuntary takeover of one of its borrowers and may, in
making its loan decision, rely on confidential information received from the
takeover target. Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d 594 (3d Cir.
1979).
In recent years, growth-oriented corporations, recognizing that de-
pressed stock prices have resulted in severe undervaluation of many corpora-
tions,2 0 have used cash tender offers to expand through acquisition, rather
than through internal expansion. 2 1 The cash tender offer is an acquisition
technique through which a prospective purchaser of a corporation can cir-
cumvent resisting management by appealing directly to shareholders of the
target corporation to sell their stock. 22  Because few corporations have suffi-
share tender offer by Blount Inc. (Blount). This offer was conditioned on the tender of 52
percent of Washington Steel's outstanding shares. Wall St. J., Mar. 13, 1979, at 12, col. 2.
Talley withdrew its tender offer on March 12, 1979. 602 F.2d at 598. Subsequently, Blount
announced that it had acquired 90 percent of the Washington Steel's shares. Wall St. J., Apr.
18, 1979, at 2, col. 2.
18. 602 F.2d at 598. Chemical alleged that it had been damaged in three ways as a result of
the preliminary injunction. First, after the injunction, Talley had reduced its deposits with
Chemical by more than $1 million which deprived Chemical of the use of these funds. Reply
Brief of Defendant TW Corporation at 2, Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d 594
(3d Cir. 1979). Second, Chemical lost a .5% commitment fee on its $20 million loan from the
date the injunction was entered. Id. Third, Chemical lost the interest payments, at a rate of
110% of the bank's prime rate, which it would have received on the Talley loan. Id. at 3.
Talley also claimed that it suffered damages as a result of the preliminary injunction, in
attempting to renegotiate a credit agreement with another lending institution. Id. at 3-4. In
addition, Talley made claims for commitment fees paid between the date of the loan agreement
and the date the injunction was entered for a credit arrangement which was extinguished by the
injunction. Id. at 4. Finally, Talley alleged damages flowing from its inability to proceed with
the tender offer as a result of the injunction. Id. at 4-5.
19. The case was argued before Circuit Judges Gibbons and Hunter, and District Judge
Meanor of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey sitting by designation.
Judge Gibbons wrote the opinion of the court.
20. See Troubh, Purchased Affection: A Primer on Cash Tender Offers, 54 HARv. Bus.
REV. 79 (1976).
21. See Much, Price Adequacy in Hostile Takeovers, National L. J., Dec. 10, 1979, at 21.
Essentially, a cash tender offer is a public invitation to the holders of a particular class of stock
to sell their shares to the offeror during a fixed period of time at a designated price, usually at a
premium above the current market price. See generally Aranow & Einhorn, Essential Ingre-
dients of the Cash Tender Invitation, 27 Bus. LAw. 415 (1972); Fleischer & Mundheim, Corpo-
rate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 317 (1967); Note, Target Management
and Tender Offers: Proposals for Structuring the Fiduciary Relationship, 15 HARv. J. LEGIS.
761 (1978); Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1250 (1973); Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HAnv. L. REV. 377
(1969).
During the past two decades the cash tender offer has become an increasingly popular and
efficient mechanism of corporate expansion. Its chief advantages are speed and limited cost and
risk. See Troubh, supra note 20, at 80-81.
22. See note 21 supra. Commentators have suggested that the cash tender offer is preferable
to other acquisition techniques in three situations: 1) when acquisition is opposed; 2) when the
3
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cient cash reserves to finance their tender offers, they have turned to com-
mercial banks to obtain needed financing.
23
Generally, the relationship between a bank and its customer is that of
debtor and creditor-the bank's duty being merely to pay the amount depos-
ited upon demand. 24  Courts have recognized, however, that in certain
bank-customer transactions which go beyond the typical deposit account
situation, there exists a relationship of trust and confidence which justifies
imposing a fiduciary duty upon the bank. 25 Recently, questions have arisen
concerning whether, in light of a bank's access to confidential information
concerning its borrowers, a bank owes a fiduciary duty to a corporate bor-
rower which precludes the bank from financing an involuntary takeover of
that borrower.26 Even though the specific circumstances which give rise to
target board will not sponsor the acquisition; or 3) when there is inadequate time for a merger.
1 J. FLOM, M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND TAKEOUTS-TENDER OFFERS AND
GOING PRIVATE 9 (1976).
23. See Cole, Role of Banks Challenged in Unfriendly Takeovers, N.Y. Times, June 11,
1979, § D, at 1, col. 1.
24. See, e.g., A. MICHIE, MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING, ch. 9, § 1 (1973); Annot., 70
A.L.R.3d 1344, 1347 (1976).
25. See, e.g., Milohnich v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 So. 2d 759, 760 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969)
(bank has implied contractual duty not to disclose information concerning depositor's accounts to
third parties); Richfield Bank & Trust Co. v. Sjogren, 309 Minn. 362, 369, 244 N.W.2d 648,
652 (1976) (bank's duty to disclose material information to a customer seeking a loan); Pigg v.
Robertson, 549 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (bank's duty not to use information acquired
from customer in dealings antagonistic to the customer).
The basis for the application of fiduciary principles to the bank-customer relationship was
explained by the Arizona Supreme Court in Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 49 Ariz. 34, 64 P.2d
101 (1937). The Stewart court noted that, in the past, most commercial transactions were for
cash and that banks originally were merely places of security where a person could deposit his
cash and valuables. Id. at 45, 64 P.2d at 106. However, in light of the highly complicated
modern structure of credit, the court pointed out that
[i]t is almost inconceivable that any man should engage in financial transactions of any
magnitude in the modern time without having recourse to some bank not only as a place
of safety to keep his money, but as a place where he might secure loans to conduct his
business. It is notorious that modern banks, before they make a loan of any extent, make
a rigid investigation of the business of their customers, and even the purpose for which
the loan is to be used, basing their action thereon.
Id.
Under the traditional rule, a fiduciary is prohibited from using knowledge acquired through
a fiduciary relationship to subvert the principal's purpose in establishing the relationship. See
Trice v. Comstock, 121 F. 620, 622 (8th Cir. 1903).
26. See, e.g., Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,286 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); American Medicorp, Inc. v. Continental Ill.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 475 F. Supp. 5 (N.D. Il. 1977); Microdot, Inc. v. Irving Trust Co.,
Index No. 01/23/76 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed Jan. 21, 1976) (litigation dropped when Microdot ac-
cepted a competing offer from Northwest Industries, Inc.). See also notes 36-39 and accompany-
ing text infra.
In addition, bank involvement in tender offer financing was the subject of recent congres-
sional hearings. See Corporate Takeovers: Hearings on Regulation under Federal Banking and
Securities Laws of Persons Involved in Corporate Takeovers Before the Senate Comm. on Bank-
ing, Housing and Urban Development, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Takeover Hearings]. The Senate Banking Committee hearings were prompted by an unsuccess-
ful tender offer, similar to the offer in Washington Steel, by General Cable Corp. for the out-
standing shares of Microdot, Inc. Id. at 1. The offer was to be financed by a loan from Irving
Trust Co. which also had a loan agreement with Microdot through which Irving received con-
[VOL. 25: p. 981
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such a fiduciary duty have not been clearly defined, 27 courts have tradition-
ally considered whether a customer has placed his confidence in a bank and
whether such confidence was invited and/or accepted.
28
Although finding that banks generally invite confidences, 29 the New
York Supreme Court, in M.L. Stewart & Co. v. Marcus,30 held that a cor-
poration could not regard as a confidence its communication of information
which it knew to be false. 31 In Marcus, the plaintiff corporation requested a
loan to finance its purchase of real property, 32 falsely informing the bank
that it had already entered into a purchase agreement. 33  Upon learning of
the plaintiff's misrepresentation, the bank successfully negotiated and fi-
nanced the purchase of the same property for another bank customer. 34  De-
spite ruling that the misrepresentation precluded a finding of fiduciary duty,
the Marcus court recognized that the necessities of a competitive industrial
system of business should be tempered by the "teachings of morality" so that
banks cannot take advantage of their customers' confidences. 35
American Medicorp, Inc. v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust
Co.38 was the only case prior to Washington Steel to examine fully the ques-
fidential information concerning Microdot's sales, earnings, and daily cash flow. Id. at 2. The
purpose of the hearings was to study the "adequacy or regulation, under the banking and se-
curities laws, of persons involved in corporate takeovers." Id. at 1.
27. Compare Klein v. First Edina Nat'l Bank, 293 Minn. 418, 422, 196 N.W.2d 619, 623
(1972) (bank transacting business with customer need not inform him of every material fact
relating to transaction unless special circumstances exist) with M.L. Stewart & Co. v. Marcus,
124 Misc. 86, 93, 207 N.Y.S. 685, 692 (Sup. Ct. 1924) (fiduciary relationship nonexistent unless
bank consents either expressly or impliedly). For an attempt to define those circumstances
which lead to a fiduciary relationship between a bank and its customers, see Hagedorn,
Fiduciary Aspects of the Bank-Customer Relationship, 34 Mo. B.J. 406 (1978).
28. See, e.g., Pigg v. Robertson, 549 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Stenberg v. North-
western Nat'l Bank, 307 Minn. 487, 238 N.W.2d 218 (1976) (en banc); Klein v. First Edina Nat'l
Bank, 293 Minn. 418, 422, 196 N.W.2d 619, 623 (1972); M.L. Stewart & Co. v. Marcus, 124
Misc. 86, 207 N.Y.S. 685 (Sup. Ct. 1924). See also Hagedorn, supra note 27, at 410.
29. M.L. Stewart & Co. v. Marcus, 124 Misc. 86, 92, 207 N.Y.S. 685, 692 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
The Marcus court noted that a person cannot impose a trust or confidence upon an unwilling
party, but that "banks present a constant invitation to intending borrowers and thus subject
themselves to whatever implication or obligation is to be drawn from that fact." Id.
30. 124 Misc. 86, 207 N.Y.S. 685 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
31. Id. at 94, 207 N.Y.S. at 693.
32. Id. at 88, 207 N.Y.S. at 687.
33. Id.
34. Id. Prior to learning of the plaintiff corporation's interest in the property, Marcus, the
vice-president of the bank, had agreed to negotiate the purchase of the same real estate for
another depositor, the Russek Company. Id. at 87, 207 N.Y.S. at 686. Marcus, on behalf of
Russek, and the plaintiff made competitive offers for the property, although each was unaware
of the other's bid. Id. The seller was interested in the plaintiff's higher bid and entered into
negotiations with him. Id.
35. Id. at 92, 207 N.Y.S. at 691.
36. 475 F. Supp. 5 (N.D. I1. 1977), noted in Note, Bank Financing of Involuntary Take-
overs of Corporate Customers: A Breach of Fiduciary Duty?, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 827
(1978). Continental Bank had agreed to finance a hostile takeover of the plaintiff, a corporate
borrower which had, in the course of its dealings with the bank, supplied the bank with its
earnings projections. 475 F. Supp. at 7. The plaintiff contended that a bank, by obtaining
confidential information from a loan customer, assumed an absolute obligation not to act ad-
versely to the borrower's interests. Id. at 10. American made three arguments in support of its
motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the takeover loan. First, American contended that
1979-1980]
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tion of whether a bank should be permitted to finance the involuntary
takeover of one of its corporate borrowers. 37 The district court in Continen-
tal Bank held that a bank should be free to extend a loan to finance the
involuntary takeover of a corporate client, provided that the bank, in decid-
ing to underwrite the takeover, does not rely upon confidential information
furnished by that customer. 38 In light of the fact that banks often deal with
customers who have conflicting interests, the Continental Bank court
reasoned that an absolute bar to bank participation in hostile takeovers of
corporate customers would "tend to burden the free flow of bank financing
a loan to finance the involuntary takeover of a customer which has furnished confidential infor-
mation to the bank is a per se breach of the fiduciary obligation owed by a bank to its customer.
Id. at 7. Alternatively, American contended that Continental had used the confidential informa-
tion in determining whether to make the loan to Humana, Inc. (Humana), the prospective
purchaser. Id. Additionally, American alleged that Continental had disclosed the confidential
information to Humana. Id.
37. It should be noted that this question was addressed briefly in two other cases. See
Harnischfeger Corp. v. Paccar, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Wis. 1979); Humana, Inc. v.
American Medicorp, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,286
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
In Harnischfeger, plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction to forestall a tender offer for
plaintiff's common stock, alleging, inter alia, a breach of fiduciary duty by defendant Citibank.
474 F. Supp. at 1152. After examining the evidence, the Harnischfeger court concluded that
there had been no breach of Citibank's "'Chinese Wall," and thus, no breach of fiduciary duty
had occurred. Id. at 1153-54. For a discussion of the operation of a "Chinese Wall," see notes
40-42 and accompanying text infra.
In Humana, a lawsuit arising out of the attempted takeover of American Medicorp, Inc.,
plaintiff alleged the improper use of confidential information by the bank which financed the
tender offer. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,286, at 92, 829. The
Humana court agreed with the court's finding in American Medicorp, Inc. v. Continental Ill.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., that there had been no misuse of confidential information. Id. See
notes 38-39 and accompanying text infra. Nevertheless, the Humana court expressed reserva-
tions about this type of bank activity, stating: "[S]ince banks play such a critical role in deter-
mining whether tender offers will go forward and as a result exert such significant influence in
determining which management survives, it seems highly desirable that the potential for conflict
should be avoided by the voluntary behavior of the bank itself." [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,286 at 92,829 (emphasis added).
38. 475 F. Supp. at 8. In denying plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction of the
takeover loan, the court initially rejected plaintiff's contention that Continental Bank's participa-
tion in the takeover financing was a per se violation of the bank's duty to its customer. Id. The
court based its rejection of this argument on the absence of case law "supporting a complete
prohibition against lending money to a company seeking to take over one of the bank's custom-
ers which has provided it with 'non-public' information," Id. According to the court, the cases
relied upon by the plaintiff did not require the court to enforce such a broad per se duty. Id.
Despite the perusal of the American Medicorp file by two bank officers working on the
Humana, Inc. loan, and even though an informal meeting had taken place between officers
working on the two accounts, the court found no evidence that the bank had actually relied
upon confidential information in deciding to make the Humana, Inc. loan. Id. at 8-9. The court
reasoned that such an examination would not be crucial to the bank's decision to make a loan.
Id. Indeed, the bank would not be exercising good business judgment if it assumed that the
assets of the acquired corporation would be used to repay a takeover loan, especially in light of
the speculative nature of a takeover. Id. at 9.
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiff's allegation that Continental Bank had disclosed
confidential information to third parties. Id. The court found insufficient evidence to support
such an assertion. Id.
[VOL. 25: p. 981
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and the ability which a bank now has to deal with customers who have
adverse interests to other customers."
3 9
In order to prevent the unauthorized use of confidential information,
some banks have erected within their loan departments a variant of the
"Chinese Wall," 40 the technique created by banks to prevent invest-
ment department misuse of inside information acquired from borrowers
by the commercial loan department a. 4  An intradepartmental "Chinese
Wall" restricts the access of loan officers responsible for a tender offer loan
to confidential information supplied to the loan department by the target
corporation 42
In Washington Steel, the Third Circuit, after deciding that the case was
not rendered moot by Talley's withdrawal of its tender offer,4 3 considered
whether a bank has a per se fiduciary obligation to refrain from financing the
39. Id. at 7. See also Lutcher S.A. Celulose e Papel v. Inter-American Dev. Bank, 382 F.2d
454, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (no duty exists, independent of contract, which would impair the
bank's right to make loans to competitors of its customers). But cf. Humana, Inc. v. American
Medicorp, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,286, at 92,829
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (banks should voluntarily avoid the potential for conflict). For a discussion of
Humana, see note 37, supra.
40. See, e.g., Herzel & Rosenberg, Loans to Finance Tender Offers: The Bank's Legal Prob-
lems, 96 BANKING L.J. 676, 679 (1979); The Chinese Wall: A Necessary Precaution in Tender-
Offer Loans, BANK LOAN OFFICERS REP., April 1979, 1.
41. For a discussion of the operation of the "Chinese Wall" in bank trust departments, see
generally Bruzda & Seidel, Bank Trust Departments and the 10b-5 Dilemma, 21 VILL. L. REV.
367, 385-91 (1976); Herman & Safanda, The Commercial Bank Trust Department and the
'Wall," 14 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L.R. 21 (1972); Herzel & Coiling, The Chinese Wall and
Conflict of Interest in Banks, 34 Bus. LAw. 73 (1978); Lipton & Mazur, The Chinese Wall
Solution to the Conflict Problems of Securities Firms, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 459 (1975).
In the aftermath of the expansive reading given to insider liability under SEC Rule 10b-5,
17 C.F.R. § 240. 10b-5 (1976), following the Commission's ruling in In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,
40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), multiservice banks faced a dilemma caused by the conflicting duties owed
to corporate borrowers, trust beneficiaries, and the investing public. See Bruzda & Seidel,
supra, at 375. Bruzda and Seidel observed:
The bank's obligation to the commercial loan customer would require it to keep the in-
formation confidential, while its duty to the trust beneficiaries would require it to utilize
the information in deciding whether to purchase or dispose of the stock for the trust
accounts. Further, its responsibility to the investing public under rule 10b-5 would re-
quire the bank to either publicly disclose the inside information (which would defy its
duty to the commercial loan customer) or refrain from trading in. the commercial loan
customer's securities for its trust accounts (which would defy its obligation to the trust
beneficiaries).
Id. The implementation of the "Chinese Wall" was advocated as a solution to the predicament.
See id.
42. See generally Herzel & Rosenberg, supra note 40.
43. See 602 F.2d at 599; note 17 and accompanying text supra. Judge Gibbons concluded
that this appeal was viable because the Third Circuit would be faced with the same issues on an
appeal from the disposition of a claim to recover damages on the injunction bond. Id. at 598.
The court supported its decision by citing prior cases in which, even though the primary claim
had been settled before appellate review, the prospect of a suit on the bond prevented the
lawsuit from becoming moot. Id. at 599, citing Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 305-06 (1964)
(underlying labor dispute mooted but appeal allowed for union's claim on injunction bond);
Kelin v. Califano, 586 F.2d 250, 256 (3d Cir. 1978) (en banc) (medicaid funding dispute settled
but appeal heard because of appellant's intention to seek recoupment for past expenditures in
compliance with injunctions); American Bible Soc'y v. Blount, 446 F.2d 588, 594-95 (3d Cir.
1971) (although amendment of regulation rendered enforcement action moot, appeal allowed
because of likelihood same issue would be presented in a future suit on injunction bond).
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involuntary takeover of its borrowers. 4 4 Judge Gibbons noted that not only
was a broad fiduciary duty unprecedented, 4 but that it had been explicitly
rejected in Continental Bank. 46  Furthermore, the Third Circuit maintained
that the adoption of a per se rule would dramatically affect the availability




The Washington Steel court further found that Chemical had not, in
fact, misused the confidential information. 4 9  The court refused to presume
misuse from the mere fact that the bank official supervising the Washington
Steel account had attended a meeting at which the Talley loan was dis-
cussed. 50  Testimony that discussion between bank officers working on the
Washington Steel and Talley accounts had been prohibited and that all of
the Washington Steel files had been secured to prevent their inspection by
those responsible for the Talley loan persuaded the court that all necessary
precautions had been taken. 5 1
Finally, the Third Circuit held that the bank would not have violated
any fiduciary duty had it used the information obtained from Washington
Steel in deciding whether to make the loan to Talley.5 2  The Washington
44. 602 F.2d at 599-601. The plaintiff contended that a bank, by obtaining confidential in-
formation from a loan customer, assumed an absolute obligation not to act adversely to the
borrower's interests. Id. at 599. Although Washington Steel did not rely upon Chemical's serv-
ice as registrar of the company's stock as inferring the per se fiduciary duty it advocated, the
Third Circuit stated that it would have rejected such an argument. Id. at 599 n.2.
45. Id. at 599-600. Although the Marcus case was cited to support the plaintiff's position,
the court felt that Marcus weakened Washington Steel s argument to the extent that it was
relevant at all. Id. at 600. The Third Circuit maintained that the plaintiff's proposed per se rule
would "undermine" the business necessities recognized by the Marcus court. Id. For a discus-
sion of the Marcus case, see notes 29-35 and accompanying text supra. Judge Gibbons similarly
dismissed the other cases cited in support of the per se duty, characterizing them as attempts to
"draw a fiduciary rabbit from a commercial loan agreement hat." 602 F.2d at 600.
46. 602 F.2d at 600. For a discussion of Continental Bank, see notes 36-39 and accompany-
ing text supra.
47. 602 F.2d at 601, citing Note, supra note 36, at 835. The court expressed concern that if
such a per se duty was imposed, a corporation could easily insulate itself from takover by
entering into loan transactions and supplying nonpublic information to the limited number of
banks with sufficient assets to participate in tender offer financing. 602 F.2d at 601.
48. 602 F.2d at 601. judge Gibbons stated that the legislature would be better able to
"strike the appropriate balance between sound economics on the one hand, and expectations of
loyalty on the other." Id. Furthermore, the court noted that a state common law fiduciary duty
impacting on an area as vital to the national economy as banking would, in all probability, be
preempted by federal regulation. Id.
49. id. at 602. Although defendants Chemical and Talley asserted that the Pennsylvania
Securities Commission had previously determined that no misuse had occurred, Judge Gibbons
ruled that Chemical and Talley had forfeited the right to the benefits of collateral estoppel on
appeal because of their failure to plead this affirmative defense in the district court. Id. at 603
n.4. See FED. R. CIv. P. 8(c) (failure to plead an affirmative defense results in forfeiture).
50. 602 F.2d at 602. See text accompanying notes 8-9 supra.
51. 602 F.2d at 603. Washington Steel had argued that, in light of Talley's allegedly weak
financial condition, Chemical would not have granted the loan without special knowledge of
Washington Steel's financial situation. Id. at 602. However, judge Gibbons found that Chemical
had performed a "worst-case" analysis which had convinced the bank of Talley's ability to repay
the loan. Id. But cf. note 16 supra (noting concern in the financial community over Talley's
financial condition).
52. 602 F.2d at 603. The Third Circuit explicitly limited its holding to permitting the use of
confidential information within the loan department. Id. Judge Gibbons recognized that the
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Steel court found that, in the interest of sound banking practice, banks
should be free to rely on confidential information supplied by one borrower
in evaluating commercial credit transactions with other borrowers. 53  Ac-
cording to the court, a commercial loan department has an overriding obli-
gation to consider all information available to it in order to avoid taking
"imprudent risks" with depositors' money. 54 The Washington Steel court
believed that restricting the bank's use of confidential information might
unduly discourage the free flow of bank credit-"the largest part, by far, of
the national money supply."
55
In view of the generally accepted freedom of banks to deal among cus-
tomers with adverse interests, 56 it is submitted that the Third Circuit cor-
rectly rejected a per se rule against a bank's participation in the takeover of
one of its customers. 57  Arguably, the practical effect of the imposition of
such a per se duty would be decreased competition in every industry.
58
Fearing that small, expanding businesses may be potential takeover
targets, 59 a bank might be reluctant to finance small and new business en-
terprises if such loans would preclude the bank from making more profitable
loans to acquiring corporations. Furthermore, by opening accounts with the
relatively limited number of banks with sufficient assets to finance tender
transfer of confidential information obtained from the target corporation to the bank's invest-
ment department or to the acquiring corporation might violate the federal securities laws. Id.
See note 41 supra.
53. 602 F.2d at 603.
54. Id. According to the Third Circuit, a bank might arguably be violating its duties to its
depositors by ignoring relevant information it has on file from its borrowers. Id. For a critical
analysis of this argument, see notes 73-74 and accompanying text infra.
55. 602 F.2d at 603. The court emphasized that the adverse impact on the free flow of funds
which would be created by limiting the bank's use of information in its files was the fundamen-
tal reason for rejection of the per se rule advocated by Washington Steel. Id.
56. See Takeover Hearings, supra note 26, at 38-39 (statement of Gordon T. Wallis, Chair-
man of the Board, Irving Trust Co.). The Continental Bank court took this position in denying
the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction when it stated that a bar to bank participation
in hostile takeover would "tend to burden the free flow of bank financing and the ability which
a bank now has to deal with customers who may have adverse interests to other customers." 475
F. Supp. at 9 (emphasis added). For a discussion of Continental Bank, see notes 36-39 and
accompanying text supra. See also Lutcher S.A. Celulose e Papel v. Inter-American Dev. Bank,
382 F.2d 454, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (no duty exists, independent of contract, which would
impair the bank's right to make loans to competitors of its customers). But cf. Humana, Inc. v.
American Medicorp, Inc. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP (CCH) 96,286, at
92,829 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (banks should voluntarily avoid the potential for conflict). For a discus-
sion of Humana, see note 37 supra.
57. See 602 F.2d at 601.
58. See Takeover Hearings, supra note 26, at 39 (statement of Gordon T. Wallis, Chairman
of the Board, Irving Trust Co.). Mr. Wallis further suggested that a bank should consider two
questions when it deals with customers who have adverse interests: 1) whether the service
requested by one customer requires recourse to confidential information supplied by the other;
and 2) where the confidentiality of customer information is protected, whether the bank, as a
matter of business judgment, wishes to finance the project. Id.
59. For a discussion of the characteristics of a likely takeover target, see E. ARANOW & H.
EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1-9 (1973).
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offers, 60 target management could preserve its control at the expense of
shareholder profits. 6 1  Such a sensitive economic matter is, as the court
noted, more properly suited to legislative factfinding and policy determina-
tion than to judicial decree.
62
Nevertheless, in authorizing the loan department's use of confidential
information received from one customer in evaluating a loan to another bor-
rower, 63 the Third Circuit reached beyond the factual question before it to
create an unprecedented rule of law. The court's reasoning that a bank must
be free to utilize all available information in order to conduct its loan trans-
actions successfully 64 deviates from the traditional rule that the recipient of
confidential information may not use that information in a manner in-
consistent with the confiding party's purpose in disclosing it. 6 5 The
Washington Steel decision allows a bank to exploit its position as the recip-
ient of confidential information by extending profitable loans to what might
otherwise seem to be unsound credit risks. 66 In permitting such a result,
the Third Circuit appears to have disregarded the Marcus court's admonition
that banks should temper their business judgments with "moral considera-
tions." 67  In emphasizing the "necessities of a competitive industrial system
of business," Judge Gibbons seemingly dismissed the Marcus court's concern
for the achievement of sound business ethics.
68
60. See Takeover Hearings, supra note 26, at 37 (statement of Gordon T. Wallis, Chairman
of the Board, Irving Trust Co.). Mr. Wallis pointed out that most corporations would not have
enough cash available to finance tender offers by themselves. Id. He felt that it would be
inefficient, if not impossible, for a corporation to raise the necessary capital for a takeover
attempt through the marketing of securities. Id.
61. One commentator has recognized the capacity of the tender offer "to drive an economic
wedge between target management and target securityholders." Bromberg, Tender Offers:
Safeguards and Restraints-An Interest Analysis, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 613, 656 (1970).
Target management, despite its fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders, may
attempt to thwart a tender offer which would be beneficial to those interests because of the fear
of loss of employment, power, or prestige. Id. Congress has also recognized the potential com-
peting interests of target management and shareholders. 113 CONG. REc. 854 (1967) (statement
of Senator Harrison Williams). Senator Williams, in introducing legislation to regulate tender
offers, stated: "I have taken extreme care with this legislation [the Williams Act] to balance the
scales equally to protect the legitimate interests of the corporation, management, and
shareholders without unduly impeding cash takeover bids." Id.
62. See notes 47-48 and accompanying text supra.
63. See 602 F.2d at 604; notes 52-55 and accompanying text supra.
64. 602 F.2d at 603.
65. See Trice v. Comstock, 121 F. 620, 622 (8th Cir. 1903). The Trice court stated that a
fiduciary is prohibited from using knowledge acquired through a fiduciary relationship to sub-
vert the principal's purpose in establishing the relationship. Id.
66. It is suggested that a bank would be more likely to finance an otherwise marginal
takeover if it had access to confidential information indicating the soundness of the venture.
Chemical's claims for lost profits due to the preliminary injunction demonstrate the profitability
that tender offer financing holds for a banking institution. See note 18 supra. In making a
takeover loan decision, banks also consider the possibility that a successful takeover will result
in the transfer of millions of dollars of demand deposits to the financing bank. Schwartz &
Kelly, Bank Financing of Corporate Acquisitions-The Cash Tender Offer, 88 BANKING L.J. 99,
101 n.3 (1971).
67. See 124 Misc. at 92, 207 N.Y.S. at 691; text accompanying note 35 supra.
68. Compare Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d at 600 (emphasizing the
"necessities of a competitive industrial system of business") with M.L. Stewart & Co. v. Mar-
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Because Judge Gibbons believed that the adoption of a rule restricting a
bank's use of confidential information would have consequences involving
considerations of economic policy, he left that decision to the legislature.
69
Such judicial restraint, however, appears to be unwarranted. Arguably, con-
gressional inaction subsequent to a recent hearing on bank involvement in
corporate takeovers 70 was influenced by the suggestion of a representative of
the banking industry that bankers fully expect that common law remedies
are available to those damaged by a bank's abuse of confidences.
71
The arguments advanced by the Third Circuit to support its contrary
conclusion that banks have no fiduciary duty to refrain from using confiden-
tial information appear to be less than convincing. Judge Gibbon's conten-
tion that a no use rule would force banks to make uninformed decisions
72
ignores the fact that a bank financing a takeover would not normally have
access to confidential information concerning the target. Only the fortuity
that both the acquiring and target corporations borrow from the same bank
makes the confidential information available. Further, the court's suggestion
that the bank's duties to its depositors compel it to utilize "all available in-
formation" 7 is also subject to question. Under traditional trust law, a
fiduciary has no duty to violate the law to further the interests of its ben-
eficiaries. 74 In presuming that the use of confidential information is lawful
for purposes of arguing that such use should be lawful, the court engages in
circular reasoning. Finally, it is difficult to accept the Third Circuit's prop-
osition that a no use rule would stem the free flow of bank credit. 75  Since
banks do not normally have access to confidential information, it is unclear
why the inability to use such information, when available, would significantly
impact tender offer financing. Furthermore, information concerning the fi-
nancial well-being of the target corporation is of questionable relevance to
the commercial lender since bankers, in making their loan decisons, tend to
rely on the borrower's ability to repay the loan rather than on their anticipa-
tion that the target will be a source for loan repayment following the
takeover.
76
It is submitted that a sounder legal basis for the Washington Steel deci-
sion would have been the adoption of the more conservative approach of the
Continental Bank analysis which allowed bank participation in customer
cus, 124 Misc. at 92, 207 N.Y.S. at 691 (suggesting that business decisions be tempered by the
"teachings of morality").
69. 602 F.2d at 601. See notes 47-48 and accompanying text supra.
70. See generally Takeover Hearings, supra note 26.
71. See id. at 99 (statement of Richard A. Debs, First Vice-President and Chief Administra-
tive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
72. 602 F.2d at 603. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
73. 602 F.2d at 603. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
74. See 2 A. ScoTT, TRUSTS § 166 (3d ed. 1967).
75. See 602 F.2d at 603; note 55 and accompanying text supra.
76. See Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 96,286, at 92,829 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); American Medicorp, Inc. v. Continental
I11. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 475 F. Supp. at 9.
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takeovers while recognizing fiduciary limitations on the use of confidential
information. 7 7  Although fiduciary obligations have only been imposed on
banks in limited circumstances, 78 courts have recognized that a bank may
not make unauthorized use of confidential information entrusted to it by a
customer. 79  In view of the fact that banks compel prospective borrowers to
make substantial confidential disclosures in order to obtain loans necessary to
conduct their businesses,8 0 fairness should require that banks be allowed to
use this information solely for the purposes intended by the borrowers.
Although it might be argued that the Third Circuit's decision prevents
spurious litigation by target management resisting a takeover, 8 1 it is
suggested that a more appropriate response would have been to recognize
the existence of an intradepartmental "Chinese Wall" 8 2 as prima facie evi-
dence that the bank had not misused confidential information. In this way,
77. See American Medicorp, Inc. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 475 F. Supp.
at 8; notes 36-39 and accompanying text supra.
78. See notes 24-28 and accompanying text supra.
79. See, e.g., Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,286, at 92,829 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("a special relationship which may be
designated fiduciary or confidential does exist between a prospective borrower and its bank
which should preclude the bank from disseminating or using the information for improper pur-
poses"); American Medicorp, Inc. v, Continentall Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 475 F. Supp. at 8
(bank may finance a hostile takeover of one of its borrowers so long as it does not rely on
confidential information supplied by the borrower). See also Takeover Hearings, supra note 26,
at 99 (statement of Richard A. Debs, First Vice-President and Chief Administrative Officer,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York) ("There is a special relationship between banks and their
customers that is based on confidence and trust in the bank itself, and in the bank's commitment
to safeguard the confidential [sic] affairs of its customers"); Herzel & Rosenberg, supra note
40, at 673-83 (banks should implement a "Chinese Wall" to avoid misuing confidential informa-
tion).
80. See Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 49 Ariz. 34, 45, 64 P.2d 101, 106 (1937); note 25
supra.
81. One commentator has observed that lawsuits following the announcement of a takeover
bid are "inevitable." Wachtell, Special Tender Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 Bus. LAw. 1433,
1434 (1977). The litigation stemming from the recent attempt by Humana, Inc. to take over
American Medicorp, Inc. is illustrative of the multiplicity of legal actions which can arise after a
tender offer. This single takeover attempt engendered five different law suits. See Humana, Inc.
v. American Medicorp, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,286,
at 92,825-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (motion for preliminary injunction alleging violations of Williams
Act and breach of fiduciary duty by bank's financing of tender offer); American Medicorp, Inc.
v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 475 F. Supp. 5 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (motion for prelimi-
nary injunction to enjoin bank from financing tender offer alleging bank's breach of fiduciary
duty); Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (tender
offeror alleged violations of the Williams Act); American Medicorp, Inc. v. Humana, Inc., 445
F. Supp. 589 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (motion for preliminary injunction alleging violations of federal
antitrust laws); American Medicorp, Inc. v. Humana, Inc., 381 A.2d 571 (Del. Ch. 1977) (motion
to enjoin exchange offer alleging violation of Delaware law governing tender offers). See also
notes 36-39 and accompanying text supra. In addition, both the Pennsylvania Securities Com-
mission and the Securities and Exchange Commission determined that there was no legal im-
pediment to allowing Humana, Inc. to make an exchange offer to American Medicorp, Inc.
shareholders. See Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to Injunction Pending Appeal at 4 s1.*, Ameri-
can Medicorp, Inc. v. Continental I11. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., No. 78-1002 (7th Cir., filed Jan.
9, 1978).
82. For a discussion of the characteristics of a "Chinese Wall," see notes 40-42 and accom-
panying text supra.
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borrowers' expectations of confidentiality would be protected without provid-
ing target management with additional defensive tactics with which to op-
pose tender offers.
83
In the instant case, Chemical had the opportunity to misuse confidential
information, but it is apparent that no information about Washington Steel
was disclosed other than the fact of its relationship with Chemical.8 4 The
bank meeting attended by an officer responsible for the Washington Steel
account apparently took place for the sole purpose of considering the poten-
tial conflict in serving both corporations, rather than to assess the merits of
the Talley loan.8 5 Without this ability to review potential conflicts, banks
would be caught in a legal "Catch-22" 8 6 in which the very attempt to ascer-
tain and avoid breaching their obligations would constitute, in itself, a
breach of trust and confidence.
Nevertheless, despite the bank's stated limited purpose of simply assess-
ing the conflict,8 7 its means were not particularly well-tailored to carry out
this purpose.88 Even tlfough a bank, in making its loan decision, will nor-
mally rely primarily on the borrower's financial status rather than the
target's,8 9 the confidential information may be material in marginal tender
offers where the acquiring corporation is financially weak and the target's
assets may be used to repay the loan. Significantly, in Washington Steel,
Talley's financial status was not considered particularly strong.90
The Washington Steel decision established that, within the Third Cir-
cuit, bank financing of the involuntary takeover of a corporate customer does
83. It is submitted that this result is consistent with the congressional policy toward take-
overs expressed through the enactment of the Williams Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e),
78n(d)-(f) (1976). Federal regulation of cash tender offers, as proposed under an earlier bill, S.
2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), had a strong anti-takeover bias. See 111 CONG. REc. 28, 257
(1965) (remarks of Senator Williams) (characterizing tender offerors as "white collar pirates" who
reduce "proud old companies" to corporate shells); Note, Cash Tender Offers, supra note 21, at
377, 381 n.28. When tender offer regulation was subsequently enacted, however, the Senate
Committee provided a more evenhanded appraisal of the purpose of the Act:
The Committee has taken extreme care to avoid tipping the balance of regulation in favor
of management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid. The bill is designed to
require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors while at the same time provid-
ing the offeror and management an equal opportunity to present their case.
SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, FULL DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE EQUITY
OWNERSHIP AND IN CORPORATE TAKEOVER BIDS, S. Rep. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1967).
84. See 602 F.2d at 596; text accompanying notes 8-9 supra.
85. See text accompanying notes 8-9 supra.
86. J. HELLER, CATCH-22 (1961). Defendant Chemical made this argument. See Reply Brief
of Defendant TW Corp. at 27, Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d 594 (3d Cir.
1979).
87. See 602 F.2d at 596.
88. It seems probable that Chemical had no need for the officer in charge of the Washington
Steel account to be present at the meeting to discuss the potential conflict of interest involved
in making a takeover loan to Talley. Apparently, Chemical was already aware of the conflict
since the bank knew who was in charge of the Washington Steel account.
89. See note 76 and accompanying text supra.
90. See note 16 supra.
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not constitute a per se violation of any fiduciary duty owed to that cus-
tomer. 9 1 Consequently, any absolute prohibition against unfriendly
takeover financing will have to come from the legislature. Since it is gener-
ally accepted that banks are not precluded from making loans to com-
petitors of their customers, 92 it is unlikely that this decision will effect a
substantial change in bank lending practices.
The greatest impact of Washington Steel will, it is submitted, emanate
from that portion of the opinion which permits banks to use confidential
information received from one borrower in deciding whether to make loans
to other borrowers. 93 Arguably, small, expanding businesses which are
likely takeover candidates 94 will be particularly reluctant to provide the con-
fidential disclosures necessary to arrange loans with a bank which engages in
takeover financing out of fear that the confidential information may be used
in a manner adverse to their corporate interests. Further, the bank's greater
input in determining which tender offers go forward may well augur greater
bank control over corporate expansion. 95 Significantly, however, because a
bank is particularly dependent upon its ability to maintain the confidence of
its customers, 96 the impact of the broad holding in Washington Steel may be
mitigated by voluntary self-restraint on the part of banks. The appearance of
impropriety resulting from a bank's use of confidential information in con-
nection with takeover financing may engender a great deal of concern among
corporate clients which are potential takeover targets, and banks will have to
balance this concern against the economic benefit to be derived from using
such information.
By refusing to impose fiduciary limitations on a bank's use of confiden-
tial information acquired from its customers, the Third Circuit has set a prec-
edent against judicial interference with banking practices. 97 In view of the
lack of support in prior case law and in sound legal principles, 9 it seems
unlikely that the broad holding of Washington Steel will find widespread
acceptance outside the Third Circuit.
John C. Sullivan
91. See 602 F.2d at 601.
92. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
93. See 602 F.2d at 603.
94. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 59, at 1-9.
95. Banks already play an important role in determining which tender offers will go forward
since, without bank financing, few corporations would be able to raise the necessary capital for a
takeover attempt. See note 60 supra. After Washington Steel, however, banks will be able to
analyze not only the credit worthiness of the corporation seeking tender offer financing, but also
the financial position of the target corporation on the basis of confidential information if the
target is a client of the bank. See notes 89-90 and accompanying text supra.
96. See Takeover Hearings, supra note 26, at 99-100 (statement of Richard A. Debs, First
Vice-President and Chief Administrative Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
97. See notes 47-48 & 69 and accompanying text supra.
98. See notes 63-68 and accompanying text supra.
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